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The Deduction of Legal Fees
Relating to Crimes, Divorce,
and Taxes
Carter Bledsoe
Many questions concerning the deductibility of legal fees remain un-
answered. The author reviews the current court decisions as to whether
legal fees incident to the unsuccessful defense of a criminal charge, a
divorce or separation, or the giving of tax advice will be deductible in any
given fact situation and concludes with a presentation of possible future
problems inherent in each area.
HE TAX PRACTITIONER has always exhorted his fellow
attorneys, with varying success, to advise their clients as to
what extent the lawyer's charges are deductible for federal income
tax purposes. But since the Internal Revenue Code does not spe-
cifically mention legal fees in
the context of deduction, and
THE AUTHOR (A.B., Haverford College, since the law in the area is
LL.B., George Washington University) made by judicial and by admin-
is a practicing attorney in Cleveland, istrative fiat, the tax practi-
Ohio, and a member of the Ohio Bar. tioner's own counsel that fes
are deductible is sometimes
given with more hope than
conviction. The deduction of legal fees is permitted, if at all, under
section 162 of the Code,' which allows the deduction of all ordi-
nary and necessary expenses incurred in carrying on any trade or
business, or under section 212,2 allowing the deduction of expenses
incurred for the production or collection of income, for the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the pro-
duction of income, or in connection with the determination, collec-
tion, or refund of any tax.
It is clear that a legal fee or related expense is either, for
purposes of deduction, (1) an expense described in these sections,
and thus deductible, (2) a capital item in connection with tite to
property, which must be capitalized and thus is not deductible per
se, or (3) a personal expense which is not deductible in any event
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162 [hereinafter cited as CODE].
2 CODE § 212.
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as prescribed in section 262.' Corporations, and perhaps partner-
ships because they are presumed not to make personal expenditures,
in most cases have onlt to resolve the issue of whether the legal
fee is an ordinary and necessary expense or must be capitalized.
Individuals and entities taxable as individuals, such as trusts, must
choose among the three alternatives.
The authorities on the issue of deduction versus capitalization,
though legion, lay down no easy or sensible rule because Congress
has provided no standards for capitalization beyond the provisions
of sections 162 and 212 and the requirement in section 1016 that
the tax basis should be increased by expenditures properly charge-
able to the capital account Thus, any discussion of recent legal
developments in that area simply mirrors the unsatisfactory and
diverse results of prior decisions,5 a situation which will not change
until Congress amplifies the law, if a workable amplification is at
all possible. Regarding the issue of deduction versus personal
expense, however, the courts are in the process of making important
revisions particularly involving the deductibility of legal fees in
connection with crimes, divorces, and taxes.
I. LEGAL FEES IN CONNECTION WITH
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner v. Tellier? has
added a new and unfamiliar dimension to criminal law. The penal
colony, well versed in appeals for new trials on the basis of Esco-
bedo v. Illinois7 and later decisions,8 must now master claims for
tax refunds.' Of course, this rather lame observation is by way of
pointing out that the Tellier decision represents a sweeping depar-
ture from prior judge-made law. Since 1924 the general rule has
been that taxpayers could not deduct legal and related costs incurred
in the unsuccessful defense of criminal prosecutions even though
3 CODE § 262.
4 COD 5 263 allows no deductions for "any amounts paid out for new buildings
or for permanent improvements ... made to increase the value of any property or estate."
5 See Note, The Deductibility of Attorneys' Fees, 74 HARV. L REV. 1409 (1961).
6 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
7378 U.S. 478 (1964).
8 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9 Ile Fifth Circuit has gone so far as to overturn, on the basis of Tellier, a trial
court's stipulation between the government and the taxpayer denying deduction for
legal fees incurred by the taxpayer in unsuccessful defense of criminal indictment.
Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1966).
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the criminal activity was dearly connected with the taxpayer's busi-
ness'" because such deduction would violate public policy. The
rationale of the rule was based upon the assertion that an act in
violation of public policy was either (1) not "ordinary and neces-
sary" within the meaning of sections 162 or 212; or (2) that ex-
penditures necessitated by a criminal charge could only be personal;
or (3) simply that such a deduction would frustrate public policy."
A. The Beginning
In 1943 the Supreme Court began the revision of this area by
refusing to apply the public policy doctrine to Commissioner v.
Heininger2 and holding that a dentist could deduct legal fees in-
curred in unsuccessfully resisting a Postmaster-General order which
terminated his mail-order denture business on the grounds of fraud.'"
The Court found that the legal fees were directly connected with
the carrying on of the mail-order business 4 and that no dearly de-
fined governmental policy required denial of the deduction since
the expense was ordinary and necessary within the accepted mean-
ing of such terms.' However, probably because Heininger drew
a distinction between statutes intended merely to protect the public
and statutes whose purpose is punitive as well, lower courts con-
tinued to ride the unruly horse of public policy,'" galloping in all
directions.'
'
0 Thomas A. Joseph, 26 T.C. 562 (1956); Burroughs Bldg. Materials Co., 18
B.T.A. 101 (1929), affd, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931); Norvin R. Lindheim, 2 B.T.A.
229 (1925); Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924).
"Burroughs Bldg. Materials Co., supra note 10.
12 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
18 Id. at 475.
14 Id. at 470.
1 Id. at 474.
16 The Heininger decision has been distinguished. E.g., Lewis v. Commissioner,
253 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1958); F. Strauss & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 724
(8th Cir. 1957), afld sub nom. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959);
Cammarano v. United States, 246 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 498 (1959);
Nicholas D. Wusich, 35 T.C. 279 (1960); James E. Caldwell & Co., 24 T.C. 597
(1955), rev'd, 234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956). The Heininger decision has often been
followed. E.g., Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Com-
missioner v. Standing, 259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1958); Capitol Indem. Ins. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 237 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Macy, 215 F.2d 875 (2d
Cir. 1954); E. W. Edwards & Sons v. United States, 162 F. Supp. 97 (N.D.N.Y. 1957),
aff'd, 255 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1958).
17 I, for one, protest, as my Lord has done, against arguing too strongly upon
public policy; - it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride
it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound
law. It is never argued at all but when other points fail. Richardson v.
Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824).
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B. The Rule as Modified
The major step in the revision of the general rule that legal
fees incurred in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal charge were
not deductible came as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in
Commissioner v. Tellier."8 The taxpayer, a securities dealer, was
tried and convicted on a thirty-six count indictment charging him
with violations of the fraud section of the Securities Act of 1933,1
with violations of the mail fraud statute," and with conspiracy to
violate these statutes." He was sentenced to four and one-half
years in jail and was fined eighteen thousand dollars 2 Perhaps as
an afterthought to his difficulties, in 1956 he claimed a deduction
in the amount of $22,964.20, representing expenditures incurred
in the unsuccessful defense of the criminal charges. The Commis-
sioner's disallowance of this deduction was sustained by the Tax
Court on public policy grounds." The Second Circuit reversed, 4
stating that were it not for the time-honored public policy test,
there could be no doubt that the taxpayer's legal expenses were
ordinary and necessary within the meaning of section 162 of the
Code since the criminal indictment sprang directly from his conduct
of the securities' business.2" The court also observed that attempts
to apply a public policy rule which seeks to distinguish between
civil and criminal liability and successful and unsuccessful defense
has caused repeated difficulty in borderline cases.2 Disbarment
proceedings, for example, have been classified as criminal and the
legal expenses disallowed." Legal expenses paid on behalf of an
employee who has been found guilty of violating certain sections
of the California Administrative Code relating to horse racing 8 and
who, as a result, lost his license as a trainer have been held de-
18 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
19 Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a)
(1964).
20 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964).
21 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
2 2 United States v. Tellier, 255 F.2d 441 (2d Cit. 1956).
2 Walter F. Tellier, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1207 (1963), modified, 342 F.2d 690
(2d Cir. 1965), alf'd, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
2 4 Commissioner v. Tellier, 342 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965), afPd, 383 U.S. 687
(1966).
25 Id. at 694.
26 Ibid.
2TEstate of G. A. Buder, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 336 (1963), aff'd on other grounds,
330 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1964).
2 8 CAL. ADmN. CODE § 1508, 1930, 1936.
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ductible.29 The court finally noted that it could find no sharply de-
fined public policy against the deduction of legal fees incurred in
the unsuccessful defense of a criminal prosecution and thus held
that the deduction should be allowed. 80
The Supreme Court in a brief opinion affirmed,8 indicating that
the Second Circuit was correct in its construction of the "ordinary
and necessary" phrase of section 162 in that any expense which
has its origin in the conduct of the taxpayer's business meets the
statutory test,82 citing its 1963 decision in United States v. Gilmore.88
The Court went on to dismiss the public policy issue for two basic
reasons: first, the income tax is not a sanction against wrongdoing
and as such does not concern itself with the lawfulness of the in-
come that it taxes; and, second, in view of the recent Gideon v.
Wainwright84 decision it is clear that no public policy is offended
when a man faced with a serious criminal charge employs a lawyer
to assist in his defense.85
The reliance of the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court upon
legislative history for the proposition that the income tax was de-
signed as a revenue measure and not as a control on the manners
and morals of the union is interesting. Both decisions refer to
the statement made by Senator Williams during the Senate debate
upon the first modern income tax law"6 that "The tax is not levied
for the purpose of restraining people from betting on horse races
or upon 'futures,' but the tax is framed for the purpose of making
a man pay upon his net income, his actual profit during the year."8"
Today, of course, no one would contend that the motives and pur-
poses of the income tax law are limited in any sense to the produc-
tion of revenue, since the Code is used, for example, to encourage
and reward mineral exploration,88 to encourage capital develop-
ment,8 9 and to restrain domestic investment abroad.4" In fact, moral
29 Robert S. Howard, 32 T.C. 1284 (1959).
80 342 F.2d at 695.
31 Commissioner v. Telier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
82 Id. at 689.
88 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
84372 U.S. 335 (1963).
35 383 U.S. at 691-64.
36 Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166.
87 50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams).
88 CODE § 613.
39 CODE § 38.
4 0 CODE §§ 4911-14.
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considerations are still prominent in the law. Taxpayers are by
statute refused deductions for bribes paid foreign officials.41 In
addition, certain types of lobbying expenses involving appeals to
the public in connection with the advancement or defeat of legisla-
tion are non-deductible, as are gambling losses in excess of gam-
bling gains.4" But the important distinction which must be made,
in this regard is that these rules are established by congressional
action and, as yet, Congress has given no authority to the courts or
the Commissioner to depart from Senator Williams' thesis.44
Without specific congressional authorization, notwithstanding
the above distinction, the Supreme Court until Tellier had not
always adhered to this doctrine. In Commissioner v. Sullivan45 the
Court permitted the deduction of expenses incurred in an illegal
gambling business, reasoning that although an expenditure bears a
remote relation to an illegal act this in itself does not make it
non-deductible.4" However, in Cammarano v. United States,47 the
Court refused to permit a liquor dealer to deduct the expenses in-
curred in an attempt to defeat the passage of state prohibition legis-
lation prior to the enactment of section 162(e) which expressly
prohibits such deductions. This decision was in part based upon
the premise that the Commissioner's long-standing Regulations on
the subject had acquired the force and effect of law,4" a theory
which may have represented Mr. Justice Frankfurter's influence.49
But the logical difference between an expense of an illegal gam-
bling enterprise and the expense of influencing the public concern-
ing legislation vital to one's business is difficult to draw for pur-
poses of section 162 deductions. In any event, Tellier and section
162(e) which relates to deduction of lobbying expenses have now
pre-empted the field, and only a small area of conflict in the public
policy domain remains.
C. Conditions for Deductibility
Of course, the fact that the allowance of a legal expense is not
4 1 CODE § 162(c).
42 CODE § 162(e).
4 3 CODE § 165(d).
44 50 CONG. REc. 3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams).
45 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
46 Id. at 29.
47 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
48 Section 162(e) was enacted by Pub. Law 87-834 § 3(a), 76 Stat. 973 (1962).
49 See Ar. Justice Frankfu-ter's dissent in Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145,
177-78 (1960).
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against public policy does not insure the deduction. The taxpayer
must demonstrate that the expense is connected with his business
within the meaning of section 162 or is connected with the range
of activities described in section 212 and in accord with the criteria
most recently enunciated in United States v. Gilmore.5" Gilmore
involved the attempt by an individual to deduct the legal expenses
incurred in protecting his stock, representing control of a corpora-
tion, from his wife's alimony and property settlement demands.
He argued that since the stock represented the source of most of
his income by way of dividends and salary as an officer of the
corporation, legal fees incurred to protect tide to the stock quali-
fied under section 212(2) as expenses in connection with the con-
servation or maintenance of property held for the production of
income." The Supreme Court disagreed, saying that although the
legal fees were superficially connected with the conservation of
income-producing property, the test of deduction under section 212
goes to the nature and origin of the claim which gives rise to the
litigation requiring the expenditure of legal fees rather than to the
effect of the litigation upon the taxpayer's business, income, or
income-producing property." Since the divorce was entirely per-
sonal in nature, as distinguished from a business enterprise or from
activity which had its origin in the production of income or the
conservation of income-producing property, the expenses arising
from the divorce were also personal and, accordingly, not deduct-
ible.53
In Finger v. United States54 a physician, sued by the husband
of the physician's nurse to recover damages for loss of consortium
and for causing the nurse to become an alcoholic and a drug addict,
deducted his substantial legal fees on the ground that the suit
jeopardized his license to practice medicine. The District Court of
South Carolina denied the deduction, saying that what the taxpayer
defended was his personal rather than his professional conduct and
as such, under the Gilmore decision, the legal fees incident to his
defense were not ordinary and necessary business expenses. 5 The
50 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
51 Id. at 42-43.
52 Id. at 49.
53Id. at 51-52. Although Gilmore is an excellent articulation of the doctrine,
the Supreme Court has attempted since the decision of Lykes v. United States, 343
U.S. 118 (1952) to settle the law in this area.
54 257 F. Supp. 312 (D.S.C. 1966).
55Id. at 314.
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Court acknowledged that had the taxpayer been sued by a patient
for malpractice he would have been allowed a deduction for the
legal fees as a business expense but asserted that in the present
case it would require "great fertility of imagination.., to conjure
allegations of a more intimate and personal nature.""
Another physician, convicted of criminal abortion, attempted
to deduct the legal expenses incurred in his defense.5" The Tax
Court refused in a pre-Tellier case to permit the deduction on the
grounds of public policy" but also noted that the physician had
failed to prove that the expenditure was related to his business,
the practice of medicine.5" It may be imagined that a more vigorous
defense could establish a direct relation between the taxpayer's prac-
tice of medicine and the abortion, but in any case the decision
serves as an example of the absolute necessity of coloring with
business purpose the original source of the controversy giving rise
to the legal expense. The argument that the result of the litigation
or controversy will destroy the source of the taxpayer's income or
will destroy his business is not, as the Supreme Court pointed out
in Gilmore,"0 sufficient to relate the expenditure to sections 162 or
212.
In Nadiak v. Commissioner6 an airline pilot, sued for assault
and battery and larceny arising from his relationship with a former
wife, claimed that since a conviction would result in the loss of
his pilot's license and therefore his chief source of income, the ex-
penses of defense were deductible under section 212. The court
correctly denied the deduction on the grounds that the daim arose
only in connection with the taxpayer's personal activity and not
his profit-seeking activity - thus dearly indicating that the legality
of the deduction does not depend upon the potential consequences
of a taxpayer's failure to defend a criminal prosecution.
It may be that future decisions in this area will attempt to give
impetus to the judicial interpretation of community morals by re-
fusing deductions for legal expenses and other expenses incurred
in connection with criminal activity. But after Tellier, the decisions
must be based upon the business or profit-seeking origin test rather
than upon the public policy or standard of the community argument.
56 Ibid.
5 7 Henry L Peckman, 40 T.C. 315 (1963), af'd, 327 F.2d 885 (4th Cir. 1964).
58 Id. at 317-18.
59 Id. at 317.
60 372 U.S. at 50-51.
61356 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1966).
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This development is beneficial to the interpreters of the tax law; it
is difficult enough to test deductions against the explicit terms of
a complex statute rather than to match the propriety of deductions
against vague public policy.
D. Exception
There is one exception to the Tellier doctrine. In Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner62 and Hoover Express Co. v. United
States,63 both decided prior to Tellier, the Supreme Court upheld
the disallowance of deductions claimed by taxpayers for fines and
penalties imposed for violating state statutes on the rationale first
enunciated in Lilly v. Commissioner.4 The Court in Tellier reaf-
firmed the Tank Truck doctrine by saying that, where the allowance
of a deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or state
policies proscribing particular forms of conduct, and where the
policies frustrated are evidenced by some governmental declaration,
the deduction will be denied.6" In this context, the test of nonde-
ductibility always relates to the severity and immediacy of the frus-
tration resulting from the allowance of the deduction. Thus, the
Court has recognized a narrow public policy rule applicable only
where the deduction would frustrate state or national law. The
policy has a practical appeal in situations similar to Tank Truck,
that is, where the denied deduction involved fines and penalties
imposed under a Pennsylvania statute for the deliberate and con-
tinued violation of state maximum-load limitations.66 It would, on
the other hand, permit deduction where the expenditure involved
was illegal only under the letter of archaic law." It would pre-
sumably deny deduction for expenditures which are illegal per se,
such as bribes to public officials,6" but only if the statute against
such expenditures was viable and presently enforced in the com-
munity. It would permit deduction of the expenses of an illegal
business, for example, the rent of the gambling establishment in
Sullivan,9 unless the expenditure itself were illegal.
62 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
63 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
64 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
65 383 U.S. at 694.
66 356 U.S. at 31.
67 Sterling Distribs., Inc. v. Patterson, 236 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
6 8 Cf. CODE § 162 (e).
69 Any inference of disapproval of these expenses [wages and rent] is absent
here. The Regulations, indeed, point the other way, for they make the fed-
[VoL 18: 862
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It could be argued that the disallowance of any deduction on
the grounds that the deduction would frustrate state or national
law is not consistent with the concept of the income tax as a revenue
measure unconcerned with morality. This argument is probably
correct in theory. But in the practical world the Supreme Court
seems to have struck a sensible balance.
E. Future Practice
It will be interesting to see just how far the courts will carry
the Tellier doctrine. The Commissioner has, on the basis of Tel-
lier, already reversed his policy and permitted deduction of attorney
fees and related legal expenses paid or incurred in the unsuccessful
defense of a -prosecution for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act7" and of claims by the United States under section 4(a) of the
Clayton Act.7  The decision will give new support to the deduc-
tion not only of legal fees in connection with criminal prosecution
but also to the deduction of various types of expenses, the validity
or legality of which is questionable. For example, the Court of
Claims is apparently correct in holding that expenditures for enter-
tainment and gifts furnished to state employees were allowable busi-
ness expenses where state law was not violated1  An Alabama
court is also correct in deciding that premiums and rebates given
to retailers are deductible despite state statutes making it a crime to
offer inducements or to extend credit7 on the theory that the crimi-
nal statutes were a "dead letter" not expressive of current com-
munity enforcement practices.7' Presumably, the decision will force
reconsideration of such cases as United Draperies, Inc. v. Commis-
sionerm which denied a deduction for kickbacks and rebates to the
purchasing manager of a customer on the grounds that the mores
of the market place do not encompass such payments as an ordinary
eral excise tax on wagers deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. This seems to us to be recognition of a gambling enterprise as a
business for federal tax purposes.... MThe "fact that an expenditure bears
a remote relation to an illegal act" does not make it nondeductible. Com-
missioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 28-29 (1958).
70 Rev. Rul. 66-330, 1966 INT. REv. BULL. No. 45, at 5, revoking Rev. Rul.
62-175, 1962-2 CUm. BULL. 50.
71 Ibid.
7 2 Dukehart-Hughes Tractor Equip. Co. v. United States, 341 F.2d 613 (Ct. Cl.
1965).
78 A.A. CODE tit 29, §§ 6, 37, 41, 78 (1958).
7 4 Sterling Distribs., Inc. v. Patterson, 236 F. Supp. 479 (N.D. Ala. 1964).
75 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964).
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means of securing or promoting business. The Sixth Circuit prob-
ably will reconsider the doctrine of Acker v. United States76 which
held that legal fees incurred in defense of a criminal tax evasion
prosecution are not deductible, although, as will be discussed,77 there
is some authority in favor of the argument that the act of omitting
income from an individual's return or the fraudulent preparation of
such a return are personal as opposed to business decisions, and,
accordingly, expenses flowing as a consequence of these acts are
not sufficiently connected with business to be deductible under
section 162 even though the income with which such acts are con-
cerned is derived from the conduct of the business.7
II. LEGAL FEES IN CONNECTION WITH DIVORCE
A. Generally
The expense of engaging a lawyer in connection with personal
or family affairs is not deductible.79 Thus, legal expenses incurred
in defending a personal injury suit," securing a release from the
army,"' and seeking a divorce8" have been disallowed as personal
expenses. But in recent years the ingenuity of tax practitioners
has secured deduction under section 212 for some of the legal fees
involved in divorce.
The provisions of section 212, added by the Revenue Act of
1942,8" were intended to reverse the Supreme Court's holding in
Higgins v. Commissioner84 that investment activity did not consti-
tute a trade or business and therefore that investment expenses were
not deductible under the predecessor section of what is now section
162.85 As might be imagined, the Tax Court and other courts
have experienced some difficulty in distinguishing deductible legal
expenses from those which were purely personal. The Tax Court
in the area of divorce held that a wife could deduct the legal fees
76258 F.2d 568 (6th Cir. 1958).
77 See text accompanying notes 108-30 infra.
78 Rev. Rul. 58-142, 1958 CuM. BULL. 147.
7 9 CODE § 262.
80 Henke v. Jarecki, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1159 (N.D. ill. 1956).
81 Robert S. Seese, 7 T.C. 925 (1946).
82 Smith's Estate v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1953).
8 3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §§ 23(a), 24(a) (5) added by ch. 619, 56 Star. 816,
819 (1942).
84 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
85 Id. at 216-17.
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incurred by her in her effort to obtain alimony from her husband,
pursuant to a divorce action" on the grounds that, since the alimony
was includible in the wife's income, the fees were incurred in an
attempt to produce income within the meaning of section 212.
But the Tax Court has also denied the deduction of a husband's
legal expenses incident to a divorce proceeding as purely personal
and therefore non-deductible even where he is under an obligation
to pay his wife's legal fees and even though his income-producing
property is threatened."8
B. Deductibility of Husband's Legal Fees
Aside from the question of the deductibility of a wife's legal
fees incident to divorce, the law with respect to the deduction of a
husband's fees has been greatly clarified by the Gilmore decision.
Prior to Gilmore at least two circuit courts had held that a husband
could deduct those fees paid his lawyer in connection with the
divorce action which were allocable to the lawyer's efforts to protect
the husband's income-producing property against a wife's financial
claims.8" The courts reasoned that since the property involved
represented an important source of income to the husband - in
each case the property in question was the controlling stock interest
in the corporation employing the husband - fees allocable to pro-
tection of this property were deductible under section 212(2) as
being expended for the conservation or maintenance of property
held for the production of income."0 Gilmore, as has been discussed
before," denied the deduction of similar expenditures to the hus-
band, asserting that the test of deductibility under section 212 first
depends upon the origin and nature of the claim requiring the ex-
penditure of legal fees. Since the origin and nature of the claim in
a divorce action is purely personal, the fees incident to such a claim
are also personal and must be disallowed as a deduction. 2 A
companion decision, United States v. Patrick,"8 dispelled any linger-
86EIsie B. Gale, 13 T.C. 661 (1949), af'd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951), acq.,
1952-1 CuM. BULL. 2.
87 Id. at 668.
8SLindsay C. Howard, 16 T.C. 157 (1951), affd, 202 F.2d 28 (9th Cir. 1953).
89 Bowers v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1957); Baer v. Commissioner,
196 F.2d 646 (8th Cir. 1952).
9 0 Bowers v. Commissioner, supra note 89, at 907; Baer v. Commissioner, supra
note 89, at 650.
9 1 See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
9 2 United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 52 (1963).
93 372 U.S. 53 (1963).
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ing doubt that Gilmore was limited to community property states
or to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939."4
C. Limiting the Rule
Even though the Regulations 5 explicitly permit the deduction
of legal fees incurred by a wife in attempting to collect alimony
includible in her income, the Commissioner has used the rationale
of Gilmore to contest several attempts by wives to deduct legal fees
incurred in connection with the collection of income. In Jane U.
Elliot96 the Commissioner was unsuccessful in an attempt to dis-
allow deductions for expenses incurred by a wife in a suit to collect
back alimony from her former husband. In Ruth K. Wild" the
Tax Court permitted taxpayer's deduction of fees allocable to nego-
tiating a separation agreement under which the wife was to receive
alimony taxable as income to her. This case, reviewed by all the
judges of the Tax Court," expressly separated the deductibility of
fees allocable to the securing of alimony from fees allocable to
amounts received under a general property settlement agreement not
includible in the wife's income.99 As recently as 1966 the Com-
missioner unsuccessfully attempted to disallow similar deductions,"'9
and in addition there have been reports by tax practitioners in
various districts that revenue agents have been instructed to disallow
all legal fees in connection with divorce actions.
D. Some Future Problems
It is probable that the Commissioner will not succeed in his
attempt through Gilmore to overturn the rationale of the old Elsie
B. Gale'.. decision and the present Regulations.0 The attempt to
collect alimony, includible in gross income, seems to override the
personal character of the divorce, giving a new and separate exis-
tence, so to speak, to the income-production attempt. However,
9 4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 23(a), 53 Stat. 12, as amended, 56 Stat. 819.
95 Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reg.].
96 40 T.C. 304 (1963).
97 42 T.C. 706 (1964); cf. Meyer J. Fleischman, 45 T.C. 439 (1966).
9842 T.C. at 711.
99 Id. at 710.
100 Hazel Porter, 1966 P-H T.C. Mem. Dec. 5 66079, petition for review filed
before the 6th Cir. (Sept. 1, 1966) (No. 5839-64).
101 13 T.C. 661 (1949), aff'd, 191 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1951), acq., 1952-1 CUM.
BULL. 2.
102 Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7).
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there are some unsettled problems in connection with the wife's
deduction of legal fees incurred in securing alimony. For example,
if one third of the amount received by the wife under a separation
agreement or a divorce settlement is taxable alimony and the re-
maining two thirds is non-taxable, then obviously one third of the
attorney's fee for work done in connection with the financial ele-
ments of the separation agreement or divorce settlement should be
deductible. The question that arises of course is how the allocation
is to be made. If the wife is entitled to lump sum payments in
addition to alimony, is the deductible portion computed by com-
paring the total amount of the periodic payments to be received
by the wife during her lifetime to the total of all payments, or is
the allocation computed by comparing the taxable alimony to the
total of all payments received in the year in which the attorney's
fee is paid?1"3 Obviously, it would be difficult to determine the
total amount of alimony to be received over the wife's lifetime.
Thus, the allocation method which compares amounts received in
the taxable year in which the attorney's fee is paid, although subject
to a great deal of favorable manipulation by the taxpayer, is prob-
ably the simplest method. In any event, the Service and the courts
will be inclined to accept any reasonable allocation worked out by
the parties, since it appears that these matters have not been fully
considered by any recent decisions.'04
It is interesting to speculate upon an argument for the deduction
of attorney fees incurred by a wife with respect to that situation
where the wife receives no alimony but instead receives a lump
sum settlement or she receives some alimony and a lump sum in
addition. Can the wife contend that even though the attorney's
fee with respect to the lump sum payment is not deductible on
the theory that the lump sum payment is not included in the wife's
income, the fee should nevertheless be deductible because the prop-
erty which she receives - and this argument would be most appli-
cable if such property were securities or other income-producing
property - will produce income to her in years subsequent to the
divorce. Along the same lines, can a husband argue that his attor-
ney's fee incurred in resisting his wife's demands for alimony or
claims against his income-producing property should be deductible
under section 212(1) as having been incurred for the production
103 Sander, Divorce and Separation, 95 TAX MANAGvMENT PORTPOLUO A-26
(1964).
104 Barbara B. LeMond, 13 T.C. 670 (1949).
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of income on the theory that any relief from alimony payments to
be made or any success in retaining income-producing property rep-
resents a production of income to him in subsequent years. These
arguments, admittedly, are somewhat esoteric and will probably be
dismissed by the courts on the grounds that Gilmore specifically re-
quires that those fees incident to divorce should be characterized as
personal expenses unless they have a direct connection in the taxable
year with the production or collection of income. But nonetheless
there is no certainty in the area, and time will tell.
E. Deductibility of Charges for Tax Advice Incident to a Divorce
Both parties to a divorce action are entitled to deduct attorney
fees allocable to tax advice received by each under the specific provi-
sions of section 212(3). Although this point will be discussed in
the next section dealing with deduction for tax advice in general," 5
it may be useful for both the husband and wife to arrange the
payment of legal fees in a divorce action in order to take maximum
advantage of this provision. For example, in many divorce actions
the husband customarily pays the wife's attorney's fees. Since it
has been held that the husband cannot deduct legal fees for tax
advice to his wife' even though he pays such fees, provision could
be made for slightly larger alimony payments during the first one
or two years after divorce in an amount equal to such fees, and
thus the husband can be afforded a deduction for these legal fees
as alimony, while the wife, although such alimony is includible in
her income, will have a corresponding deduction for the legal fee
for tax advice which she in fact pays.
If a legal fee expended for the protection and preservation of a
husband's income-producing property against his wife's property
settlement demands is denied under the Gilmore rationale, may the
attorney fee be capitalized as incurred in defense of tide to the
property and added to the basis of the property? Mr. Gilmore,
an indefatigable taxpayer, took this approach after he lost his prior
case in the Supreme Court and convinced the District Court for the
Northern District of California that he was correct,0 7 although the
decision is open to some question on the theory that under Gilmore
legal fees in divorce actions are purely personal expenses. Where
the husband's efforts are directed toward protecting his property in
105 See text accompanying notes 111-17 Wirfa.
106 United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 74-75 (1962).
107 Gilmore v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 383 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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general rather than any specific portion of his property, such as the
stock involved in Gilmore, should the same principle apply? That
is, should the husband be able to add his legal costs to the basis of
his property by some allocation method? Under the rationale ex-
pressed by the district court in California, there is no reason why
such a result should not follow, although it will be difficult to
present any rational allocation approach in a circumstance where
the taxpayer holds a number of items and types of property.
HI. LEGAL FEES IN CONNECTION WITH TAx ADVICE
AND DETERMINATION
While the deductibility of expenses incurred for tax counsel are
to some extent guaranteed by section 212(3), the area of personal
tax planning expenses presents very difficult questions. The gov-
ernment has always conceded that under section 212(3) an indi-
vidual's expenses incurred in securing the preparation of a tax re-
turn are deductible. However, although the Regulations specifi-
cally authorize deduction of expenses paid or incurred in connection
with the preparation of tax returns,'"8 the Commissioner has taken
the position that legal fees for preparation of tax returns are item-
ized deductions (non-business) and thus must be taken in lieu of
the standard deduction. "' The courts have disagreed with this
position in regard to those cases where a substantial amount of
the income included on the taxpayer's return was business income
as distinguished from his salary or dividends."0 However, it is at
least probable that the Commissioner's position is correct in those
situations where the bulk of the income on the return is either so-
called passive income, that is, dividends, interest, royalties, etc., or
is derived from salary. The government has also acknowledged -
an acknowledgment required by both the plain meaning of the
statute and the legislative history of section 212(3) - that fees
incurred in connection with any tax controversy before the Service,
the courts, or in connection with claims for refund are deductible."'
The troublesome area involves fees for tax advice in connection
with tax consequences of transactions which have not yet occurred
or in connection with tax liabilities which have not yet arisen.
*.8Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957).
109 Rev. Rul. 58-142, 1958-1 CuIM. BULL. 147.
110 Clyde E. Thomas, 41 T.C. 614 (1964); James J. Standing, 28 T.C. 789, aff'd,
259 F.2d 450 (4th Cir. 1958).
"'lReg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957).
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The Regulations interpreting section 212(3) permit deduction of
fees for "tax counsel" in addition to other permissIble items of
deduction, and it would seem that this phrase would encompass
any tax advice regardless of whether the tax in question were deter-
mined, prospective, or contingent upon a future transaction. How-
ever, litigation of the issue in Davis v. United States". and Car-
penter v. United States"3 is indicative of the confusion in the area.
In Davis the taxpayer, divorced by his wife, attempted to deduct
(1) legal fees paid for advice to him in connection with various
federal tax matters arising from the negotiation and execution of a
separation and property settlement agreement, (2) his wife's attor-
ney's fees paid by the taxpayer and allocable to tax advice rendered
to her in connection with the divorce, and (3) his attorney's fees
incurred in connection with efforts to effect a minimum property
settlement."4 In any event, the Court of Claims permitted the
taxpayer to deduct his own tax legal fees under section 212(3) and
the Regulations," 5 but refused the deduction of his wife's tax fees
on the quite logical basis that section 212 deductions were limited
to the -taxpayer's own expenses. In line with the later Gilmore
decision, no deduction of those fees allocable to the taxpayer's efforts
to effect a minimum property settlement was permitted. The Su-
preme Court reviewed, affirming only that the taxpayer could not
deduct his wife's legal fees. 6 and specifically pointing out that it
was not passing judgment on the question of whether the deduction
under section 212 of his own tax legal fees was correct." '
The underlying issue in Davis was more properly framed in
the subsequent Court of Claims decision in Carpenter v. United
States."8 The taxpayer claimed as deductions his legal fees alloca-
ble to tax advice in connection with efforts made to guarantee that
payments to his wife pursuant to a divorce action were taxable as
alimony to her and deductible by him. In other words, the question
before the court was whether tax advice in connection with potential
tax liability for future years, and pertaining to arrangements which
112 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
113 338 F.2d 366 (Ct Cl. 1964).
114 The case also involved the question of whether Mr. Davis realized a capital
gain on the transfer of appreciated securities to his wife in settlement of her marital
rights, an issue upon which the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Claims, holding
that the taxpayer was subject to such gain. 370 U.S. at 71-74.
115 Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957).
116 370 U.S. at 74.
117 Ibid.
118 338 F.2d 306 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
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have not yet been completed, are deductible within the scope of
section 212(3). The court pointed out that because section 212(3)
had been enacted, the issue did not concern the usual test of whether
the legal fees had their origin in a profit-seeking activity or in an
activity connected with property held for the production of income
under the Gilmore rationale.119
Referring to the Treasury Regulations interpreting section
212(3), the court permitted the deduction, explaining that section
212(3) and the phrase "tax counsel" found in the Regulations120
indicated that the statute was intended to permit deduction for ad-
vice directed toward the discovery of a contemplated transaction's
tax consequences rather than to limit the deduction to tax advice
in connection with a transaction which has already transpired.'2 '
The government and a dissenting judge argued that because sec-
tion 212(3) was primarily designed to change the rule in Lykes v.
United States, 22 which was that legal fees paid in connection with
litigation of a gift liability were not deductible, the section should
be construed as limiting deduction to expenses of a contested tax
liability.1
2
Whatever the interpretation of the Regulations,124 the Court of
Claims' reference to the "self-enforcement" system of collecting fed-
eral taxes 25 is compelling. The court argues that since a taxpayer
is required to determine his taxes prior to any payment under the
self-assessment system, the word "determination" in the statute and
the Regulations must as a practical matter refer to tax advice given
before a tax liability has arisen and before such liability is con-
tested. 26  The same principle was applied, if not enunciated, by a
Missouri district court in Kaufmann v. United States" when a group
of stockholder-executives retained accountants to secure a ruling that
a proposed reorganization would result in no tax consequence to
the shareholders. A favorable ruling was issued, the reorganization
119 Id. at 368-69.
120 Reg. § 1.212-1(1) (1957).
121 338 F.2d at 370.
122 343 U.S. 118 (1952).
123 Id. at 121-24.
12 4 The vital words are: "In connection with the determination . .. of any tax
expenses paid or incurred by a taxpayer for tax counsel... are deductible." Reg.
i*1.212-1(1) (1957).
125 338 F.2d at 369.
126 Ibid.
127 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963), appeal dismissed, 328 F.2d 619 (8th Cir.
1964).
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took place, and the stockholders deducted both the accountants'
charges incident to obtaining the ruling and the charges for services
to determine the taxpayers' basis in the stock obtained in the reor-
ganization. The court permitted the deduction of the fees allocable
to the obtaining of the ruling on the theory that the Regulations
and the language of section 212(3) go beyond expenses incurred in
tax litigation, even though in the present case no tax consequences
would result because of the tax-free nature of the reorganization.'28
On the other hand, the court disallowed the deduction of that por-
tion of the fee which was allocable to .the determination of the
basis of the stock, noting that there was no tax controversy concern-
ing the stock basis.2 9 The correctness of this distinction is certainly
open to question, since basis calculation can always be related to
the determination of future tax consequence.
In any event, a liberal view of both Carpenter and Kaiafmann
indicates that all fees allocable to tax advice in connection with
otherwise personal transactions may now be deductible. For exam-
ple, fees which are allocable to tax advice given in connection with
the drafting of wills, estate planning, creation of trusts, charitable
and personal donations and gifts, purchase of residences, and many
other essentially personal transactions can be deductible under the
Carpenter rationale. It is extremely doubtful that the Revenue
Service will permit such deductions under the current state of the
law, but lawyers and accountants should be sensitive to the possi-
bility in terms of allocation of their fees.
This discussion has ignored the problem of the deduction of
fees allocable to tax advice under section 162 dealing with ordinary
and necessary business expenses. The question, of course, is whether
the fees for tax advice are deductible where clearly other charges
for legal advice should be capitalized under existing law, as in the
case of the acquisition of property by a corporation. Since section
162 contains no counterpart of section 212(3), it is extremely doubt-
ful that tax advice may be segregated from other legal expenses for
purposes of characterization as ordinary and necessary expenses un-
der section 162. For example, since the general rule is that legal
fees incurred by a corporation in connection with a reorganization
(as distinguished from a complete liquidation or dissolution) are
non-deductible in that the expenditures are a continuing benefit
128 Id. at 813-14.
129 Id. at 815.
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to the company and thus are capital in nature, it seems dear that
legal fees allocable to tax advice cannot be segregated from other
legal fees for purposes of deduction. Of course, &ris observation
militates against an adoption of the liberal Carpenter view under
section 212(3), for there seems to be no reason to give the expenses
of tax advice treatment different from that accorded other legal
expenses relating to a personal transaction.
